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Abstract—In this paper, we study end-to-end service reliability
in Data Center Networks (DCN) with flow and Service Function
Chains (SFCs) parallelism. In our approach, we consider large
flows to i) be split into multiple parallel smaller sub-flows; ii)
SFC along with their VNFs are replicated into at least as many
VNF instances as there are sub-flows, resulting in parallel sub-
SFCs; and iii) all sub-flows are distributed over multiple shortest
paths and processed in parallel by parallel sub-SFCs. We study
service reliability as a function of flow and SFC parallelism
and placement of parallel active and backup sub-SFCs within
DCN. Based on the probability theory and by considering both
server and VNF failures, we analytically derive for each studied
VNF placement method the probability that all sub-flows can be
successfully processed by the parallelized SFC without service
interruption. We evaluate the amount of backup VNFs required
to protect the parallelized SFC with a certain level of service
reliability. The results show that the proposed flow and SFC
parallelism in DCN can significantly increase end-to-end service
reliability, while reducing the amount of backup VNFs required,
as compared to traditional SFCs with serial traffic flows.
I. INTRODUCTION
The deployment of Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
in Data Center Networks (DCN) has given rise to new ap-
proaches to network load balancing, considering especially
the related routing protocols. When deploying Equal Cost
Multipath Protocol (ECMP), for instance, the smaller size
flows (”mice”) may end up being queued behind the large
flows (”elephant”), while at the same large flows may compete
for the same link due to hash collision, resulting in either
congested or underutilized links in DCN. Such load imbalances
have been intensely studied, and among others, it has been
already shown that breaking large flows into parallel sub-flows
and uniformly distributing the resulting sub-flows over the
network can improve the throughput, server utilization, load
balancing and reducing flow completion time (FCT) without
causing out-of-order problem (OOP) [1], [2]. Redistribution of
large and small flows over multiple paths with VNFs replicas
optimally placed in DCN has been also used to improving load
balancing and server utilization in DCNs [3], [4].
In this paper, we ask the question of the resulting end-to-
end service reliability in a system that deploys flow parallelism
and VNF replications. This question is widely open as the
current standards and solutions primarily consider the SFC
provisioning with serial traffic flows [5]–[10]. Moreover, most
methods proposed so far consider reliability of the individual
system components, such as server, VM, link or switch, and
optimize service reliability by solving reliable SFC mapping
problem. This is because the consideration of multiple relia-
bility factors is likely complex, and thus impractical. To pro-
tect active VNFs within parallelized SFCs, additional backup
VNFs, i.e., additional replicas, can replace a failed active VNF
of the same type. However, this requires server and network
over-provision. On the other hand, VNF migration methods can
also be used but require time to activate, and would thus lead to
delays due to service interruption and network reconfigurations
as well as traffic loss [5].
In this paper, we analytically study the end-to-end service
reliability in DCNs that deploys flow and VNF parallelism,
- which we jointly refer to as parallelized VNF chaining,
with consideration of VM and server failures. Based on the
probability theory and by assuming that the reliability of the
individual VMs and servers are known, we derive end-to-end
service reliability for various placement strategies of all active
and backup VNFs in an SFC. We consider placement strategies
of the backup and active SFCs as concentrated in one server, or
distributed over the network. The expressions derived allow us
to evaluate an improvement in service reliability achieved by
the backup SFC, compared to the reliability achieved without
a backup. We analyze the amount of backup VNFs required
for protection of parallelized SFCs to reach the required level
of reliability. The results show that independently of failure
protection method, the flow and VNF parallelism in DCN can
significantly increase reliability and reduce amount of backup
VNFs required as compared to amount of backup resources
used when serial traffic flow is used for the same SFC. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the
end-to-end service reliability in DCNs with SFC parallelism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the reference architecture based on CORD. Section 3
presents the reliability analysis. Numerical results are shown
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. PARALLELIZED SFC AND BACKUP STRATEGIES
Fig 1 presents the reference CORD network, where the
underlay hardware fabric consists of racks with multiple
servers, switches and links. ToR switches handle forwarding
within a rack, e.g., T1 handles traffic within Rack1. Forwarding
across racks is performed by the so-called spine switches (A1-
A3). Each server can host multiple VMs and virtual switch
(vS), e.g., programmable hypervisor switch. For a parallelized
SFC, we assume that each VM reserves as many resources
as required for one VNF to serve a sub-flow, i.e, each VM
allocates only one VNF and failure of any VM causes failure
of one VNF. All VMs are connected to vS, which provides
load balancer (LB), whereby the main task of vS/LB is to
select a VM instance, i.e., VNF, and to provide a connection
to ToR switch. We assume that DCN deploys flow and SFC
parallelism, whereby i) the serial traffic flow (elephant flow) f
is split into n parallel sub-flows (mice flows), i.e., f1 and f2;
ii) all VNFs of a certain SFC are replicated into as many active
VNF instances as there are sub-flows, resulting in parallelized
SFC, consisting of parallel sub-SFCs; and iii) all n sub-flows
are independently transmitted and processed in parallel by
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Fig. 1: CORD network [11] with parallelized flow and SFC.
n parallel sub-SFCs. We distinguish between two possible
placement strategies of each group of the same active VNF
replicas: cVNF and dVNF. cVNF concentrates all replicas of
a certain VNF within the same server, such as VNFs1 in server
S1. dVNF in contrary distributes all replicas of the same type
over different servers, see VNFs2 and VNFs3 distributed over
S3, S5 and S3, S6, respectively. As a result, sub-flow f1 is
processed by active VNFs in servers S1, S5 and S6 and sub-
flow f2 is processed by active VNFs in servers S1 and S3,
resulting in a parallel traffic distribution over DCN and servers.
Without any additional resources, a parallelized SFC is
characterized by a certain level of reliability, which depends
on the reliability of the underlying VM and servers. To
additionally protect the active VNFs over all parallel active
sub-SFCs, and thus improve reliability, a parallelized SFC can
be enhanced by parallel backup sub-SFCs. The backup VNFs
can replace any failed active VNF of the same type over any
sub-flow. Just like active VNFs, also a backup sub-SFC can
be either distributed over multiple servers 1 , e.g, S2 and S4,
or concentrated in one backup server 2 , i.e., S7. In this paper,
we consider possible failures of servers and VMs, i.e., VNFs,
whereby switches and network links are assumed as highly
reliable. We assume that per default active and backup VNFs
are never hosted in the same server.
As shown in [5], [6], to provide highly reliable communica-
tion, the most effective VNF deployment is to utilize multiple
switches, e.g., vS or ToR switch, that can detect failure in hard-
and software and redirect traffic to the corresponding available
backup VNF, if an active server or VNF fails as shown in Fig.
1, where SFC is parallelized into n = 2 active and one backup
sub-SFCs. The traffic toward another rack is routed by the
source ToR, which addresses the ToR in the destination rack.
Then traffic flows are sent to spine switches, which perform
only header lookups to route the traffic to the destination ToR
switch. We assume that the source ToR switch is able to change
an end-to-end path utilized by sub-flows over the network,
which is an important capability of CORD network utilized in
this study [11]. It should be noted that when flow and SFC
parallelism are deployed, the synchronization between VNFs
of the same type is necessary. To this end, an external state
(a) cVNF without backup.
(b) aSbN with concentrated active and distributed backup.
(c) aSbS with concentrated active and backup.
Fig. 2: cVNF:Concentrated Placement of active VNFs
repository can store internal states of VNFs. In this case, any
backup VNF would start its operation from the ”reset” state
and, then, retrieve any critical state stored by the failed original
VNF from the external state repository, and that up to the point
of its failure as discussed in [5].
A. Backup Placement Strategies
In this paper, we propose to study four different backup
placement strategies, as a result of combination of the place-
ment strategies from Fig. 1 for active VNFs, i.e, cVNF and
dVNF, and backup VNFs, i.e., 1 and 2 . We refer to these
strategies as: (i) server-network (aSbN) ii) server-server (aSbS)
iii) network-network (aNbN) and iv) network - server (aNbS),
whereby a refers to active, b refers to backup, and S refers
to strategy where VNFs are concentrated in a server, while N
indicates that VNFs are distributed over the DCN.
1) cVNF: Concentrated Placement of active VNFs: Fig.
2a shows the DCN, where active VNFs of the same type are
placed in the same server, e.g., VNFs of type 1 are placed in
server S1, VNFs 2 - in S3, etc.; they however run on different
VMs. Thus, the parallel sub-flows share servers (S1, S3 and
S5) for processing by appropriate VNFs, whereby all sub-flows
experience the same end-to-end delay, as long as all VNFs are
available, i.e., no OOP.
aSbN: Concentrated Active and Distributed Backup VNFs
Placement: In this method, as illustrated in Fig. 2b with 1 ,
the backup VNFs from backup sub-SFC are distributed over
servers S2, S4 and S6. Here, the backup server S2 protects
active VNFs 1 from server S1 as well as S1 itself. When one
VNFs on S1 fail, the traffic can be split between S1 and S2.
In case of server, e.g., S1, failure, the service of parallel flows
will be interrupted. However, if S2 can provide two backup
VNFs 1, the whole traffic can be forwarded to and processed
by backup server, S2, without any irruptions. When all backup
VNFs on active and backup servers, e.g. on S1 and S2, or both
servers fail, the service is interrupted requiring VNF migration.
aSbS: Concentrated Active and Concentrated Backup
VNFs Placement: With this method, all active VNFs are
protected by one backup server as shown in Fig. 2c with 2 .
Here, S7 within Rack 4 is a backup server, which can generally
provide one or multiple backup sub-SFCs, while recovering
failures of any active VNF and even failure of active servers,
e.g., S1, S3 or S5. The server and VNF protection is possible
as long S7 does not fail and provides enough available backup
VNFs, while backup VNFs replace only failed active VNFs.
Thus, the sub-flow needs to be redirected toward backup server
and then back to the active server with the next VNF from sub-
SFC. That delays sub-flows and can lead to OOP. For example,
when one VNF2 on server S3 fails, one sub-flow needs to be
redirected to S7, whereby a new route includes S1-S3-S7-S5.
2) dVNF: Distributed Placement of active VNFs: Fig. 3a
shows the DCN, where VNFs of the same type are placed in
different servers, e.g., VNFs of type 1 are placed in servers S1
and S3, VNFs3 in servers S1 and S5, etc. For instance, the sub-
flow f2 needs to be routed only to server S1, where it passes a
whole sub-SFC (VNF1-VNF2-VNF3) and finally leaves DCN.
The sub-flow f1 needs to pass S3 and S5 to complete the
service. Generally, the distribution of VNFs from the sub-SFC
can be different for different sub-flows as exemplary presented
in Fig. 3a. However, to avoid OOP, the VNFs of different
parallel sub-SFC needs to be distributed in the same fashion.
Thus, either the whole sub-SFC of f1 needs to be placed in
one server or VNF3 from sub-SFC of f2 has to be placed in
separate server and not in S1.
aNbN: Distributed Active and Distributed Backup VNFs
Placement: Here, the backup sub-SFCs are distributed over
multiple servers as shown by 1 in Fig. 3b. For example, the
backup server S4 protects VNF1 and VNF2 from S3 as well as
S3 itself. In contrast, S2 protects entire active sub-SFC, VNF1,
VNF2 and VNF3, containing entire backup sub-SFC. That is
a spatial case of dVNF in case an active sub-SFC is allocated
within one server. When few VNFs on active servers fail, the
traffic can be split between active and backup servers, e.g., S1
and S2. In case of server, e.g., S1, failure, the whole traffic is
forwarded to and processed by backup server, S2. When all
backup VNFs on active and backup servers, e.g. on S1 and
S2, or both servers fail, the sub-flow f2 can be redirected to
server S4 and, then, S6 to complete the server while resulting
in over-provisioning and OOP. Generally, in contrast to Fig.
3b 1 , not all active servers have to be replicated, e.g., the
backup servers S4 and S6 could be enough for protection of
both active sub-SFCs resulting however in OOP.
aNbS: Distributed Active and Concentrated Backup VNFs
Placement: In this method, all active VNFs and all active
servers can be protected by only one separate backup server.
The backup server can provide one or multiple backup sub-
SFCs. As shown in Fig. 3c by 2 , S7 within Rack 4 is a backup
server with one backup sub-SFC and can recover failures of
any active VNF and even failure of active servers. For instance,
when S3 and S5 fail, the service is not interrupted as long as
S7 does not fail and provides entire backup sub-SFC. In case
of VNF failures, only individual backup VNFs are used. Then,
(a) dVNF without backup.
(b) aNbN with distributed active and backup.
(c) aNbS with distributed active and concentrated backup.
Fig. 3: dVNF:Distributed Placement of active VNFs
the sub-flows need to be redirected toward backup server and
then back to the active server resulting in delays and OOP. For
example, when one VNF2 on server S3 fails, f1 needs to be
redirected to S7, whereby a new route includes S3-S7-S5.
III. ANALYSIS OF RELIABILITY STRATEGIES
The analytical models for availability and reliability for
complex systems are interchangeable and only defined through
availability, or reliability of the individual components [5].
Thus, we refer to service availability (reliability) as service
success, which we define as a probability that all n sub-flows
of certain large flow can successfully traverse n sub-SFCs.
Let us denote the reliability values of active and backup
servers and VM/VNFs ϕ, ϕr and υ, υr and assume that these
values are the same for all servers and VNFs, respectively;
and the failures of different components occur independently.
Based on [12], when the same backup servers protects multiple
active servers and VNFs, the availability/reliability of any
backup server ϕr may be considered only once resulting
in ϕr · ϕr = ϕr. That rule needs to be consider to de-
rive equations for service success as follow (a + ϕrb)K =∑K
i=0
(
K
i
)
aK−i(bϕr)i ≡ aK+ ϕr
∑K
i=1
(
K
i
)
aK−ibi = aK +
ϕr[(a + b)
K − aK ], where a and b are numerical values.
Additionally, we assume
∑K
i=k ai = 0, if k > K.
Our reliability analysis is generalized by assumption that
any backup VNF can replace any active VNF of the same
type. Fig. 4 illustrates this VNF deployment strategy, which
we extended to flow and SFC parallelism: DCN provides
parallelized SFC, which consists of n, e.g., n = 2 active sub-
SFCs for processing of n parallel sub-flows and additionally
Fig. 4: Strategy to handle a VNF failure.
σ parallel backup sub-SFCs to protect n sub-SFCs. Each
sub-SFC consists of Ψ different VNFs, whereby each sub-
flow needs to pass all Ψ VNFs to complete the service.
Since all n sub-flows needs to be processed in the same
manner with the same processing result, all n + σ parallel
VNFs of any type are synchronized and, thus, equivalent and
interchangeable. As presented in Fig. 4, the sub-flow f1 is first
sent to the VNF1 of sub-SFC 1, however, the second switch
redirects it to VNF2 of sub-SFC (σ + n) due to the failure
of VNF2 of sub-SFC 1. For that scenario, where only VNFs
can fail, the service success is a probability that at least n
over all n + σ sub-SFCs do not fail and can serve n sub-
flows, while at most σ VNFs of any type can fail without
service interruption. That service success probability can be
generalized as R(n) = [
∑σ
f=0
(
σ+n
f
)
(1−υ)fυσ+n−f ]Ψ. Using
this general expression, we derive the service success R(n) for
each defined VNFs placements, where we consider both VNF
and server failures. The notations are summarized in Table I.
A. Analysis on Service Success Probability
1) cVNF:Concentrated Placement of active VNFs: Here,
each active server contains the same type of VNFs, whereby
N = Ψ servers are required to implement n sub-SFCs. Thus,
each out of n ≥ 1 sub-flows needs to pass all Ψ servers. When
there is no failure protection of parallelized SFC, the service
success is defined as
R0,cv(n) = [ϕυ
n]Ψ, (1)
whereby all Ψ servers and all nΨ VNFs of n sub-SFCs have
to be available.
aSbN: Each out of Ψ active servers and its VNFs can be
protected by one backup server resulting in m = Ψ backup
servers. Each backup server contains σ ≥ 1 backup VNFs of
certain type resulting in σ ≥ 1 backup sub-SFCs over DCN.
When active server is available, at most i = min{n, σ} active
VNFs and σ − i backup VNFs can fail on active and backup
servers without service interruption, respectively. When active
server fails and backup server is available and contains σ ≥ n
backup VNFs, the service success can be still provided. In this
case, at most σ−n VNFs on any backup server can fail without
service interruption, i.e., the service success probability is
R1cv(n) =
[
ϕυn + ϕϕr
min{n,σ}∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(1− υ)iυn−i
σ−i∑
j=0
(
σ
j
)
· υσ−jr (1− υr)j + (1− ϕ)ϕr
σ−n∑
j=0
(
σ
j
)
(1− υr)j · υσ−jr
]Ψ (2)
aSbS: One backup server can contain σ ≥ 1 backup
sub-SFCs and is utilized, when active server or some active
VNFs fail. When all N = Ψ active servers are available,
at most i ∈ [0,min{n, σ}] active VNFs of each type and
j = [0, σ− i] backup VNFs of the same type can fail without
service interruption. Generally, f ∈ [0,Ψ] active servers can
fail without service interruption, when backup server provides
TABLE I: Notation
ϕ availability/reliability of the active server;
ϕr availability/reliability of a backup server;
υ availability/reliability of VNF on active server;
υr availability/reliability of VNF on backup server;
Ψ number of VNFs in a SFC and, thus, sub-SFC;
n number of parallel sub-flows and, thus, active sub-SFCs;
N number of active servers per sub-flow;
ψk number of VNFs from the same sub-SFC on server k ∈ [1, N ];
σ number of backup VNFs of the same type, i.e, backup sub-SFCs;
σ∑ a total number of backup sub-SFCs;
m number of backup servers;
σ ≥ n backup sub-SFCs. Then, any server failure results in
failure of n active VNFs of the same type, which are replaced
by n backup VNFs, whereby l ∈ [0, σ − n] backup VNFs of
the same type on backup server can also fail. The active VNFs
on the remaining Ψ− f active servers can fail as well, while
at most min{n, σ} active VNFs of each type can fail and be
replaced by backup VNFs. Thus, the service success is
R2cv(n) = ϕ
ΨυnΨ + ϕΨϕr
([min{n,σ}∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1− υ)iυn−i
σ−i∑
j=0
(
σ
j
)
(1− υr)jυσ−jr
]Ψ
− υnΨ
)
+ ϕr·
Ψ∑
f=1
(
Ψ
f
)
ϕΨ−f (1− ϕ)f
[ σ−n∑
l=0
(
σ
l
)
υσ−lr (1− υr)l
]f
·
[min{n,σ}∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1− υ)iυn−i
σ−i∑
j=0
(
σ
j
)
(1− υr)jυσ−jr
]Ψ−f
(3)
2) dVNF: Distributed Placement of active VNFs : Without
any failure protection, N ≥ 1 active servers allocate one activ
sub-SFC to serve one out of n sub-SFCs to process one out
of n sub-flows resulting in nN active servers to allocate n
sub-SFCs. Any active server k ∈ [1, N ] of a certain sub-flow
contains ψk ≤ Ψ,
∑N
k=1 ψk = Ψ, different types of VNFs.
Thus, the service success probability is determined as
R0,dv(n) =
[
ϕN
N∏
k=1
υψk
]n
(4)
aNbN: When m, N ≤ m ≤ nN , backup servers contain
σ ≥ 1 backup VNFs of certain type, there are mN σ backup sub-
SFCs to protect n sub-flows. Generally, each failed VNF of
certain type can be replaced by any out of mσN backup VNFs
of the same type through redirection of individual sub-flows.
Let’s consider all nN active and mN backup servers of type k
over all n sub-flows. We assume that at least one out of mN
backup servers have to be available to recover failures of active
servers or VNFs. When l ∈ [0, mN − 1] backup servers fail and
all n active servers of type k are available, i ∈ [0,min{n, (mN−
l)σ}] active VNFs of certain type over all n active servers can
fail without service interruption. In this case, available backup
servers have to provide enough backup VNFs of the same type,
while j =∈ [(mN−l)σ−i] backup VNFs can fail without impact
on service success. When f ∈ [1,min{n, (mN − l)σ}] active
servers fails, it is allowed that i ∈ [0,min{n− f, (mN − l)σ−
f}] additional active VNFs fail among n− f available active
servers. The i failed active VNFs are recovered by backup
VNFs of the same type from mN − l backup servers, whereby
(mN − l)σ − f − i backup VNFs of the same type can fail
without service interruption. By considering that each active
server provides ψk different VNFs and that each sub-flow has
to pass N servers, the service success is defined as
R1dv(n) =
N∏
k=1
(
(ϕυψk )n +
m
N
−1∑
l=0
(
m
N
l
)
ϕ
m
N
−l
r (1− ϕr)l
·
{
ϕn
([min{n,(mN −l)σ}∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1− υ)i · υn−i
(
m
N
−l)σ−i∑
j=0(
(m
N
− l)σ
j
)
(1− υr)jυ(
m
N
−l)σ−j
r
]ψk
− (υψk )n
)
+
min{n,(m
N
−l)σ}∑
f=1
(
n
f
)
ϕn−f (1− ϕ)f
[min{n−f,(mN −l)σ}−f∑
i=0(
n− f
i
)
(1− υ)iυn−f−i
(
m
N
−l)σ−f−i∑
j=0
(
(m
N
− l)σ
j
)
(1− υr)j
υ
(
m
N
−l)σ−j
r
]ψk})
,
(5)
aNbS: When one backup server contains σ ≥ 1 backup
sub-SFCs, f ∈ [0,min{n, σ}] active servers and i ∈
[0,min{n − f, σ − f}] active VNFs of each type can fail
without service interruption. Thus, the backup server has to
be available to provide at least f + i backup VNFs of certain
type, while j ∈ [0, σ − f − i] backup VNFs can still fail. The
service success probability is then determined as
R2dv(n) =
N∏
k=1
(
(ϕυψk )n + ϕnϕr
([min{n,σ}∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1− υ)i·
· υn−i
σ−i∑
j=0
(
σ
j
)
(1− υr)jυσ−jr
]ψk
− (υψk )n
)
+
min{n,σ}∑
f=1(
n
f
)
ϕn−f (1− ϕ)fϕr
[min{n−f,σ−f}∑
i=0
(
n− f
i
)
·
· (1− υ)iυn−f−i
σ−f−i∑
j=0
(
σ
j
)
(1− υr)jυσ−jr
]ψk)
(6)
B. Overhead Analysis
We analyze overhead by considering utilization of reserved
VNFs. We define resource utilization Ω as ratio between the
number of VNFs required for implementation of n sub-SFCs
and the amount of all reserved backup and active VNFs.
Generally, to maintain the service of all n parallel sub-flows,
at least n sub-SFCs are required. Since each sub-SFC consists
of Ψ VNFs, the total number of VNFs required is nΨ VNFs.
aSbN When Ψ active servers are protected by Ψ backup
servers, while each of them contains σ VNFs, there are in total
σΨ backup VNFs (σ backup sub-SFCs) to protect n sub-flows
and resource utilization is
Ω1cv =
nΨ
Ψ(n+σ) =
n
n+σ (7)
aSbS: If a single backup server reserves σ sub-SFCs with
Ψ VNFs each, the total amount of reserved VNFs is Ψ(n+σ)
and the resource utilization is
Ω2cv =
nΨ
Ψ(n+σ) =
n
n+σ (8)
aNbN:When nN active servers are protected by m ≥ N
backup servers, which contain σ backup VNFs of certain type,
i.e., σ sub-SFCs with Ψ VNFs, mN σ backup sub-SFCs protect
Fig. 5: Service success vs. number of parallel sub-flows n
Fig. 6: Normalized service success vs. amount of VNFs in SFC.
n active sub-SFCs resulting in mσΨN backup VNFs. Then, the
resource utilization is
Ω1dv =
nΨN
nΨN+mσΨ =
nN
nN+mσ (9)
aNbS: When single backup server reserves σ sub-SFCs
with Ψ VNFs each, the resource utilization is defined by Eq.
(8), i.e., Ω2dv = Ω
2
cv.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Now, we evaluate the service success probability R(n)
and resource utilization Ω of the proposed methods for VNF
placement and protection, whereby we verify analytical results
by Monte-Carlo simulations. Since the simulation results over-
lapped with analytical results and were obtained with 95% con-
fidence interval, we demonstrate only analytical results. Since
we generally assume, that VNF failure is more likely than
server failure, we set availability/reliability of any server and
any VNF as ϕ = ϕr = 0.999 and υ = υr = 0.9, respectively.
As expected, VNF protection method dVNF shows the best
results for N = 1, i.e., we set N = 1 for evaluation below.
Fig. 5 shows the service success R(n) as a function of
a number of parallel sub-flows n and predefined resource
utilization Ω. The amount of backup VNFs, σ, and servers
m for each protection method was set so that the resulting
resource utilization Ω reaches 0.5, i.e., 1:1 protection. The
service success increases up to 100% and 99.9% with increas-
ing number of parallel sub-flows n in case of dVNF: aNbN
and aNbS, respectively. In case of cVNF: aSbN and aSbS, the
maximal service success of 99.71% and 99.76% was reached
with n = 5 and n = 6 sub-flows/sub-SFCs, respectively.
Fig. 6 demonstrates the normalized service success as a
function of number of VNFs in SFC Ψ and the number of
TABLE II: Required amount of backup VNFs (σ) and resource
utilization (Ω) for the service success of R(n) ≥ 0.999
VNF
Protection
cVNF: aS- dVNF: aN-
n = 1 n > 1 n = 1 n > 1
σ∑ Ω n σ∑ Ω σ∑ Ω n σ∑ Ω
-bN 3 0.25 3 5 0.375 3 0.25 ≥ 15 ≥ 8 ≥ 0.652
-bS 3 0.25 6 8 0.429 3 0.25 ≥ 9 ≥ 8 ≥ 0.529
parallel sub-flows n. We set the number of backup sub-SFCs
as σ = n, that allows to maintain the service of all n sub-flows
as long as at least one server is available. The service success
probability for n > 1 is normalized by the service success
probability of serial flow, i.e., n = 1. We studied the service
success for n = 2 and n = 6, but the results for n = 2 are
only shown for aSbN and aSbS and aNbS due to significant
deviation from results for n = 6. Generally, all protection
methods with n > 1 outperformed service success of serial
flow and showed increasing service success with increasing
number of VNFs in SFC and amount of sub-SFCs n.
Table II demonstrates the total number of backup sub-SFCs
σ∑ , resource utilization (Ω) for serial n = 1 and parallel n > 1
SFCs and for each proposed VNF placement of active and
backup VNFs, when the sub-SFCs consist of Ψ = 3 VNFs and
the probability for service success has to be at least R(n) ≥
0.999. In case of aNbD, the number of backup servers was
set to m = 2, N = 1 for n > 1. The parallel VNF chaining
outperforms serial SFC regarding resource utilization Ω, which
can be increased by increasing the number of parallel sub-
flows n. Especially, the resource utilization of dVNF: aNbN
and aNbS can be further increased, e.g., Ω2dv ≥ 0.529 and
Ω1dv ≥ 0.652 by increasing n and σ. Generally, the parallelism
applied to dVNF can at least double the resource utilization
Ω for both protection methods, whereby distributed placement
of backup servers, aNbN, shows the best performance, e.g.,
σ∑ = 8 backup VNFs can protect n ≤ 15 parallel sub-flows.
However, we would like to note that only this aNbN could
reach the service success probability up to R(n) ≥ 0.99999.
Fig. 7 shows the service success related to each VNF place-
ment and protection method normalized by service success
without any protection R0(n). We set ϕ = ϕr = υ = υr =
0.9, the number of VNFs in SFC as Ψ = 4 and the number
of sub-flows as n = 4 to reach the same service success for
cVNF and dVNF, R0(n) = R0,cv(n) = R0,dv(n). For that
settings, we measured during simulation the maximal number
of inter-rack hops of sub-flows in case of service success with
a result of 5, 9,13 and 9 inter-rack hops for aSbN, aSbS,
aNbN and aNbS, respectively. The aSbN shows the minimal
number of inter-rack hops, i.e., 5, while the worst performance
regarding service success improving it only by factor 7 with a
large number of backup sub-SFCs, σ∑ > 6. In contrast, aNbN
improves the service success by factor 8 already with σ∑ ≥ 4
resulting in the maximal number of inter-rack hops.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied end-to-end service reliability in DCNs with
flow and SFC parallelism, where any large flow is split into
multiple parallel smaller sub-flows and any SFC is replicated
into multiple sub-SFCs. We defined two placement methods for
active VNFs, where VNFs of the same type are distributed over
DCN, dVNF, or concentrated in the same servers, cVNF, and
compared two different placement strategies for backup VNFs
applied to dVNF and cVNF, whereby all backup sub-SFCs
Fig. 7: Service success vs. a total amount of backup VNFs.
can be concentrated in one backup server or distributed over
multiple backup servers. Based on the probability theory, we
analytically derived for each studied VNF placement method
the service reliability in case of server and VNF failures as a
function of flow and SFC parallelism and placement of parallel
active and backup sub-SFCs within DCN. The results showed
that the parallelism in DCN significantly increases service
reliability up to 0.99999, while requires much less, at least 33%
less, backup VNFs as compared to service of serial traffic flow.
Especially dVNF with 8 backup sub-SFCs distributed over 2
backup servers can protect up to 15 sub-SFCs with reliability
0.999 and efficiency of resource utilization 65.2%.
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